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ARTICLES 
REGULATING THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 
Donna M. Nagy* 
Today in the United States, nearly ninety-five million people, 
comprising more than half of all U.S. households, invest in mutual funds 
either directly or through retirement plans.1 In April 2006, the total net 
assets of U.S. mutual funds hit a record high of nearly $9.5 trillion, held in 
8,008 separate funds.2 By way of comparison, in 1980, there were 
combined assets of approx-imately $135 billion in 564 funds.3 As these 
numbers reflect, the growth in the mutual fund industry over the last 
twenty-five years has been explosive. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), however, has not 
seen the budgetary increases that would have enabled it to stay in pace with 
the mutual fund industry. In the 1980s, the SEC sounded what became a 
perennial alarm as to its inability to keep up with industry growth and the 
consequent compromise to the effectiveness of its investment company 
inspection program.4 Self-regulation was proposed as a possible solution, 
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 1. See Mutual Fund Trading Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 6 (2005) [hereinafter Trading 
Abuses Hearing] (statement of Robert J. Hillman, Director, Financial Markets and Community 
Investment, U.S. Government Accountability Office). 
 2. Investment Company Institute, Trends In Mutual Fund Investing: April 2006 (May 30, 
2006), http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/trends_04_06.html [hereinafter Trends In Mutual Fund 
Investing]. Mutual funds are by far the most common type of investment company, and large 
groups of mutual fund portfolios under the operation of a common investment adviser or sponsor 
are generally referred to as investment company or mutual fund “complexes.” The SEC oversees 
approximately 900 complexes. See Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 37 (statement of Lori 
A. Richards, Director, SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations). 
 3. Mutual Fund Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunication and Finance 
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 138 (1993) (statement of Arthur Levitt, 
SEC Chairman) [hereinafter Mutual Fund Industry Hearing]. In 1940, when the Investment 
Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act were enacted, there were a grand total of 68 
mutual funds in operation. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUAL FUND 
MARKETS: COMPETITION VERSUS REGULATION 8 (1990). 
  4. See, e.g., McGrath Warns SEC May Use States, NASD to Oversee Advisers, Due to 
Budget Woes, 21 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 449 (1989) (bemoaning the lack of funding and 
stating that investment companies and advisers “are being inspected less frequently” (quoting 
Kathryn McGrath, then director of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management)). 
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and from time to time throughout the next two decades, the SEC, Congress, 
and industry participants considered various proposals.5 Yet, for a variety of 
reasons—including the mutual fund industry’s relatively unblemished 
regulatory record and its claim to an extraordinarily high level of public 
confidence—none of these proposals resulted in the creation of a mutual 
fund self-regulatory organization (SRO). 
Concerns about the adequacy of mutual fund oversight reached new 
heights in the wake of the market timing and late trading scandals first 
brought to public attention by New York State Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer in 2003.6 Following closely on the heels of the Enron and 
WorldCom accounting scandals that gave rise to the creation of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), these mutual fund 
trading abuse scandals prompted renewed calls for restructured mutual fund 
regulation.7 And while proposals for statutory self-regulation modeled on 
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) continue to be advanced for the mutual fund 
industry,8 even more attention is now being focused on the PCAOB’s model 
of “private” independent regulation.9 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See infra Part I.B. 
 6. See Laura Johannes et al., Fraud Charges Widen Scope of Scandal Facing Mutual Funds, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2003, at C1; Randall Smith & Tom Lauricella, Spitzer Alleges Mutual 
Funds Allowed Fraudulent Trading, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2003, at A1; Deborah Solomon et al., 
Milestone for ‘Timing’ Scandal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2003, at C1 (providing a scandal “time 
line” that commences with Spitzer’s charges against Canary Capital on September 3, 2003). See 
also William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the 
Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1403 (2006) (“Prior to Spitzer’s announcement, 
investment advisers . . . had enjoyed general approbation for the way in which they ran their 
businesses.”). 
 7. While the importance of the mutual fund trading abuse scandals, as well as the extent and 
effects of the wrongdoing, is certainly open to debate, see, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Do the Mutuals 
Need More Law?, 27 REG. 14 (2004); Henry G. Manne, What Mutual Fund Scandal?, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 8, 2004, at A22; see also Mercer Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading, 
Fund Arbitrage and the SEC’s Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV 1271, 
1274 (2006) (arguing that the SEC has “misunderstood the true nature of the scandal” and over-
reacted to occurrences of frequent trading while under-reacting to the problem of fund arbitrage), 
few would dispute that the scandals provided advocates for change with a powerful rhetorical 
vehicle. Indeed, as Professor Jonathan Macey has observed, “public policy crises, whether real or 
imagined, provide an opportunity for entrepreneurial politicians and regulators to break the typical 
log-jams that make it more difficult to pass new rules during times of ordinary politics.” Jonathan 
R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 
117, 118 (2005). Some of the calls for restructured mutual fund regulation were likely directed to 
this “policy window.” See id. at 137–38 (emphasizing “the need for federal officials to appear to 
be ‘doing something’ . . . in the wake of the scandals . . .” uncovered by Eliot Spitzer). 
 8. See Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies be Subject to a New Statutory Self-
Regulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1115, 1126 (2005) (“[A new SRO] could augment 
investment company boards, help investment companies themselves receive more rulemaking 
attention from the SEC, and, most significantly, help avoid the type of scandals that recently have 
besmirched the reputations of so many mutual fund families.”). See also American Enterprise 
Institute, Former SEC Division Directors Give Their Views on Regulatory Reform (Feb. 28, 
2006), http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1264/transcript.asp (moderated roundtable 
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This article contends that while the regulatory regime for mutual funds 
could certainly be improved, the substitution of a private entity for the SEC 
as the industry’s primary overseer is not the answer. Indeed, private 
regulation does not hold the solution for strengthening the oversight of 
mutual funds, whether along the lines of the PCAOB’s model of 
independent regulation or the self-regulatory models of the NASD and 
NYSE. Rather, assuming that further study demonstrates the desirability of 
more frequent and/or more comprehensive inspections of mutual funds and 
their advisers, Congress should infuse the SEC with the resources necessary 
to accomplish that end. This undertaking could be funded through any 
number of avenues. 
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of 
the mutual fund industry and its regulatory landscape. Part II focuses on 
private regulation and concludes that neither the PCAOB’s model of 
independent regulation nor the NASD and NYSE’s model of self-regulation 
is appropriate for the mutual fund industry. Part III explores how to 
improve the regulatory regime for the mutual fund industry and advances a 
number of suggestions. 
I. THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY AND ITS REGULATORY 
LANDSCAPE 
A. THE CURRENT REGIME 
The mutual fund industry continues to thrive despite the bevy of 
scandals revealed to the investing public in 2003 and 2004, at least by the 
measures of total assets under management ($9.485 trillion as of April 
2006) and new dollars invested (more than $500 billion in the first four 
                                                                                                                 
featuring four former directors of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management). Among other 
questions, the following was posed at the beginning of the program: “Should there be a self-
regulatory organization for mutual funds [modeled on] . . . the NASD, and if so, what functions 
should it perform?” Id. at 1–2. For the view that an SRO for mutual funds “would substitute a 
weaker enforcement regime by an SRO for a stronger regime by the SEC,” see Tamar Frankel, 
Should Funds and Investment Advisers Establish a Self-Regulatory Organization?, in THE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION, UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGING ROLES OF BANKS, 
MUTUAL FUNDS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES 447, 453 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 1997). 
 9. See, e.g., Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act of 2003, S. 1958, 108th Cong. § 201, 149 
CONG. REC. 15,977, 15,984 (2003) (introducing legislation from Senators Thomas Daschle, 
Edward Kennedy, and John Kerry that, among other things, would have established a “Mutual 
Fund Oversight Board” modeled after the PCAOB); Mutual Funds: Who’s Looking Out for 
Investors? Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises of the H.R. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 157–58 (2003) 
[hereinafter Looking Out for Investors Hearing] (statement of Professor Mercer Bullard) 
(recommending that Congress create a Mutual Fund Oversight Board). But see Donna M. Nagy, 
Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 975, 1069–71 (2005) (arguing that Congress should resist the temptation to 
replicate the PCAOB model in other areas, including the mutual fund industry). 
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months of 2006).10 Although late trading and market timing scandals 
captured the lion’s share of publicity, many other illegal practices were 
unearthed during this time period including those involving unpaid break-
point discounts,11 mispriced assets,12 and undisclosed revenue-sharing with 
broker-dealers.13 
The response to the mutual fund scandals at the federal level was 
swift.14 Although political pundits predicted the passage of mutual fund 
legislation in the wake of the scandals, Congress opted instead for a “wait 
and see” approach to evaluate the results of the SEC’s unprecedented 
efforts toward industry reform.15 Accordingly, proposals for private sector 
regulation of the mutual fund industry must be assessed in light of the 
regulatory regime described below.  
1. The Statutory Framework  
Mutual funds are regulated under each of the four principal securities 
laws: the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act),16 the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act),17 the Investment Advisers Act 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See Trends in Mutual Fund Investing, supra note 2, at 1. However, empirical research 
shows that the market timing and late trading scandals affected investor behavior: investors 
penalized both the funds that were involved in the scandals, and to a lesser extent the fund 
complexes, “by making statistically and economically significant withdrawals.” Stephen J. Choi & 
Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals 1 (N.Y.U. Law Sch. Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-07), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =877896. 
 11. Broker-Dealers: 15 Firms to Pay $21.5M, Resolving SEC, NASD Charges over 
Breakpoints, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 329, 329 (Feb. 23, 2004). 
 12. See Rachel McTague, Mutual Funds: SEC Inspections Staff Refers Fund Cases Involving 
Fair Value Pricing to Enforcement, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 801 (May 3, 2004); Press 
Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Levels Fraud Charges Against Heartland Advisors, Inc., 12 
Company Officials and Others for Misrepresentations, Mispricing and Insider Trading in Two 
High Yield Bond Funds (Dec. 11, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-
171.htm. 
 13. See Rachel McTague, Mutual Funds: SEC Enforcement Energy Goes into Probes of 
Broker-Dealers’, Funds’ Revenue-Sharing, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 97 (Jan. 19, 2004); 
Richard Hill, Mutual Funds: NASD Running ‘Sweep’ Into Fund Payments to B-DS; Dems. Agree 
to Change Funds Bill, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1918 (Nov. 17, 2003). 
 14. See Brooke Masters, A Year of Charges, Reforms for Funds: Regulators Imposed Fines, 
Crafted New Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2004, at E1. 
 15. See Rachel McTague, Mutual Funds: Donaldson, Shelby on Same Wave Length: SEC Able 
to Handle Mutual Fund Reforms, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 661 (Apr. 12, 2004) (quoting 
Senate Banking Chairman Richard Shelby’s statement that the SEC is “showing a lot of leadership 
and resolve. . . . We don’t want to do anything that would be construed in any way as undermining 
what the SEC is doing.”). 
 16. See generally Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a to 77bbbb) (providing that all public offerings of securities, including shares sold by 
mutual funds, must adhere to the registration provisions in Section 5 of the Securities Act). 
 17. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 stat. 881 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78mm) (providing broad anti-fraud provisions and regulating the broker-
dealers and underwriters involved with the distribution and sale of mutual fund shares). 
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of 1940 (the Advisers Act),18 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the 
‘40 Act).19 Often described as the most complex of these laws,20 the ‘40 Act 
was enacted specifically to regulate mutual funds and other types of 
investment companies as well as the investment advisers who manage 
them.21 
The statutory scheme in the ‘40 Act requires mutual funds to register 
with the SEC,22 mandates extensive disclosure,23 and, because disclosure 
alone was viewed as insufficiently protective of shareholder interests,24 
imposes a vast array of highly specific substantive requirements and 
prohibitions. These requirements and prohibitions include those that relate 
to mutual funds and their capital structure,25 the composition and structure 
of their boards of directors,26 the types of transactions in which they can 
engage (including a near outright ban on transactions with affiliates),27 and 
the diversification of their investments among different industries.28 
However, to mitigate some of the harshness of these provisions, the ‘40 Act 
gave the SEC broad authority to exempt investment companies and 
advisers—conditionally or unconditionally—from virtually any statutory 
requirement or prohibition.29 The ‘40 Act also gave the SEC broad authority 
to issue rules imposing additional regulatory requirements.30 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See generally Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 stat. 847 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000)) (requiring registration of all investment advisers to 
mutual funds (except banks, which are regulated separately), imposing recordkeeping, reporting, 
and disclosure requirements, containing broad anti-fraud provisions, and imposing on investment 
advisers a general fiduciary duty to the clients they serve). 
 19. See generally Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 stat. 789 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2000)). 
 20. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 262–64 (3d ed. 1998) 
(attributing the ‘40 Act’s complexity to the “different types of companies it covers and the 
intricacies of the problems it presents”). Professor Jerry Markham accords the 1940 Act an even 
more dubious distinction, rendering it the “world’s most complex statute.” Jerry W. Markham, 
Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 319, 326 n.34 (2003). 
 21. See supra note 19. 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7 (2000) (providing that unless it is registered with the SEC pursuant to 
Section 8 of the ‘40 Act, an investment company may not engage in any business in interstate 
commerce or use the mails or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce to offer for sale any 
security). 
 23. Id. § 80a-29 (requiring periodic reports to be filed with the SEC and disseminated to 
shareholders). 
 24. See TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY 
MANAGERS § 1.02[B][2][b] (2d ed. 2006 Supp.) (“In many respects, investment companies are 
like banks, insurance companies and pension funds, all of which are regulated not only by 
disclosure but also by substantive regulation.”). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (2000). 
 26. Id. § 80a-10 (2000). 
 27. Id. § 80a-17(a), (d), (e) (2000). 
 28. Id. § 80a-12 (2000). 
 29. Id. § 80a-6(c) (2000). A leading treatise notes that the SEC’s broad exemptive powers 
“allowed the SEC to impose conditions that became the new set of rules for the industry” and that 
“[t]his method allowed for an adjustment of the Act piecemeal by orders, and then by Rules, 
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As Congress envisioned, the SEC’s role in regulating mutual funds is 
substantial. In addition to its broad exemptive and rulemaking authority, the 
SEC has the responsibility of ensuring compliance with the ‘40 Act’s 
provisions and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. In 
furtherance of this end, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations (OCIE) conducts periodic inspections of mutual funds and 
their investment advisers.31 When these inspections reveal serious regu-
latory violations, or when regulatory violations are otherwise suspected, the 
Division of Enforcement can initiate investigations.32 If warranted, the 
Division may seek Commission authorization for the initiation of enforce-
ment actions which may be brought in federal court or in administrative 
proceedings.33 
As the principal regulator for broker-dealers, the NASD also plays a 
limited role in mutual fund regulation. Specifically, broker-dealers who sell 
mutual funds must comply with NASD rules pertaining to sales practices 
and advertising, and are subject to periodic examinations and inspections by 
the NASD staff. Broker-dealers who violate these rules or the federal 
securities laws are subject to discipline by the NASD. 
The statutory framework further places considerable supervisory re-
sponsibilities on a mutual fund’s board of directors, particularly 
independent (or disinterested) directors.34 Among other responsibilities, 
directors are charged with initial approval and periodic review of the mutual 
fund’s investment advisory and distribution contracts (including the fees 
charged for these services).35 These contacts must be reviewed annually and 
must be approved by a majority of the fund’s independent directors. 
Federal courts are, of course, the ultimate arbiter of whether mutual 
funds, and those who direct and advise them, have complied with their 
statutory obligations. In addition to statutory provisions that authorize both 
                                                                                                                 
without resort to legislation.” FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 24, § 1.02[B][2]. However, it 
goes on to note that approximately every ten years, Congress reviews the Act and “in most cases, 
codif[ies] the SEC’s exemptive rules, sometimes with changes.” Id. 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-38 (2000). 
 31. Investment companies and investment advisers are required to maintain records for 
examination by the SEC. See id. § 80a-30 (2000). 
 32. The Enforcement Division may initiate informal investigations on its own accord. But 
formal investigations, pursuant to which enforcement staff may subpoena documents and 
testimony, may only be initiated with approval by the Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (2006). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(d) (Supp. II 2002) (injunctive actions); 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-9(f) (West 
2006) (cease and desist orders). 
 34. See Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market 
Volatility: What Regulation By the Securities and Exchange Commission is Appropriate?, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 915 (2005) (noting that Congress structured the Investment Company 
Act in a way that positioned “the disinterested directors in the role of watchdogs to act as an 
independent check on the management of the investment company”). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (2000). 
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criminal36 and civil monetary penalties,37 the ‘40 Act provides an express 
private right of action for breaches of fiduciary duty involving 
compensation and fees paid by mutual funds to their advisers or affiliated 
persons.38 Although courts traditionally recognized implied rights of action 
under various statutory provisions, a number of recent decisions have held 
that the ‘40 Act does not give rise to causes of action that are merely 
implied from the statutory text.39 
2. Recent Regulatory Reforms 
That the mutual fund scandals were first unearthed by the New York 
State Attorney General’s Office and not the SEC, the agency principally 
charged with enforcing the federal securities laws, gave the SEC much to 
answer for.40 The question “where was the SEC?” was posed repeatedly by 
members of Congress,41 in newspaper editorials,42 and in scholarly com-
                                                                                                                 
 36. See id. § 80a-48 (2000) (stating that willful violations of the ‘40 Act are punishable by 
fines and up to five years in prison). 
 37. Id. § 80a-41. 
 38. Id. § 80a-36(b). 
 39. See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual 
Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1025 (2005) (discussing several implied rights of action, but noting the 
recent “lively debate” over whether any private rights of action should be implied under the 1940 
Act). See also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Tapping the Reservoir: Mutual Fund Litigation Under 
Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 251, 262 (2005) 
(discussing implied rights of action under the 1940 Act). 
 40. Based on a survey sent to mutual fund complexes shortly after Spitzer’s revelations, the 
SEC estimated that approximately half of the eighty-eight largest mutual funds had undisclosed 
arrangements with favored clients that allowed these shareholders to engage in market timing that 
contravened publicly stated policies regarding short term trading. See Looking Out for Investors 
Hearing, supra note 9, at 11–12 (testimony of Stephen Cutler, Director, SEC Division of 
Enforcement). Surveys to the 34 largest broker-dealers revealed that more than 25% permitted 
certain customers to place or confirm orders after 4:00 p.m. and receive the 4:00 p.m. net asset 
value (NAV) price. Id. 
 41. See Stephen Labaton, Extensive Flaws at Mutual Funds Cited at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2003, at A1 (highlighting bipartisan criticism of the SEC’s failure to detect mutual fund 
trading abuses). 
 42. See, e.g., Steve Bailey, Op-Ed., Asleep at the Switch, B. GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2003, at D1. 
As the scandals roll out across Wall Street and beyond . . . the question “Where was the 
Securities and Exchange Commission?” is becoming part of the lexicon. . . . It has been 
left to New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer to uncover one problem after another 
in the securities business and to show the SEC and its boss, William Donaldson, what 
regulation is all about. 
Id. See also Editorial, Eliot Spitzer, Once Again, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2003, at 120. 
Where is the [SEC] in this reform effort? . . . Why did it leave it to a state AG to 
oversee the mutual-fund industry, just as it did with Wall Street research? . . . If 
Washington doesn’t want 50 Eliot Spitzers making policy, it had better make sure the 
SEC and Justice do their jobs. 
Id. 
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mentary.43 The question was also the principal focus of a report to Congress 
prepared by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).44 Not 
surprisingly, the SEC’s failure to detect the mutual fund trading abuses has 
been attributed to a variety of factors, including inadequate resources and 
inaccurate risk assessment by SEC staff, the latter due in part to the staff’s 
mistaken belief that mutual fund complexes were being vigilant in self-
policing frequent trading.45 Others have argued that the SEC, and more 
particularly its Division of Investment Management, fell prey to the 
problem of agency capture.46 
Yet even the SEC’s critics would likely acknowledge that the SEC 
placed a high priority on reform once it was alerted to the extent of the 
trading abuses in the mutual fund industry.47 Specifically, the SEC 
responded to the scandals with aggressive rulemaking, stepped-up 
enforcement actions, and a revamped mutual fund inspection program that 
revised examination techniques and significantly expanded the number of 
examiners. The following sub-sections briefly explore each of these 
regulatory reforms. 
                                                                                                                 
 43. John C. Coffee, Jr., A Course of Inaction: Where was the SEC When the Mutual Fund 
Scandal Happened?, LEGAL AFF., March/April 2004, at 46, available at http://www.legal 
affairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/review_coffee_marapr04.msp. See also Paul G. Mahoney, 
Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 177–78 (2004) (raising 
important policy questions, including “why didn’t the Securities and Exchange Commission 
discover the late trading and market timing abuses until they had apparently become 
widespread?”). 
 44. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND TRADING ABUSES: LESSONS 
CAN BE LEARNED FROM SEC NOT HAVING DETECTED VIOLATIONS AT AN EARLIER STAGE,  
REP. NO. GAO-05-313 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05313.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO Lessons Learned Report]. 
 45. See id. at 11–12. (recognizing that the SEC faced “competing examination priorities and 
had limited examination resources prior to September 2003” and noting that the SEC staff viewed 
fund complexes as having “financial incentives to control frequent trading”). 
 46. See Oversight Hearing on Mutual Funds: Hidden Fees, Misgovernance and Other 
Practices that Harm Investors: Hearing Before the Financial Management, the Budget, and Int’l 
Security Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov. Affairs, 108th Cong. 268 (2004) (statement of Professor 
John P. Freeman) (arguing that the SEC’s Division of Investment Management “has become far 
too deferential to the industry” and thus “presents a classic case of ‘regulatory capture’”). See also 
Coffee, supra note 43, at 46 (“[A]dopting a profile of being tougher than the SEC may further 
Spitzer’s political ambitions, but this does not mean that he is wrong to suggest that the SEC has 
been too soft—that it has, to a degree, been ‘captured’ by the politically powerful mutual fund 
industry.”); Macey, supra note 7, at 117–18 (“The SEC’s passivity” in areas including mutual 
fund regulation “was likely caused by the agency’s capture by the same special interests it was 
ostensibly regulating.”). 
 47. Some might contend that the principal impetus for reform was a need on the part of SEC 
officials to restore the agency’s reputation as an effective regulator. See Jonathan R. Macey, 
Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: 
The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L REV. 951, 967 (2005) (“It is hardly 
likely that the SEC’s neglect of the problems in the mutual fund industry would have ended so 
suddenly without the pressure exerted by the New York Attorney General’s interest in the issue.”). 
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a. Mutual Fund Rulemaking 
Mutual fund initiatives were much on the minds of SEC officials after 
the burst of the so-called high-tech bubble and the collapses of Enron and 
WorldCom.48 But the pace of the SEC’s rulemaking agenda quickened sub-
stantially in the months following the public revelation of the late trading 
and market timing scandals. 
A principal component of the SEC’s rulemaking agenda involved the 
tightening of internal controls and operations of mutual funds. Pursuant to 
these new rules, investment companies and investment advisers registered 
with the SEC are required to implement, review, and maintain “written 
compliance policies and procedures designed to prevent, detect, and correct 
compliance problems in key areas of their operations.”49 Mutual funds and 
their advisers must also designate a chief compliance officer (CCO) who is 
responsible for monitoring both the entity’s compliance with laws and 
regulations and the entity’s own written policies and procedures.50 In addi-
tion, registered investment advisers must adopt written codes of ethics, a 
mandate previously applicable only to investment companies.51 
Other new rules were designed to enhance the governance structure of 
mutual funds. The most important (and most controversial) of these gover-
nance rules required that in order for a mutual fund to avail itself of certain 
SEC exemptions, the chairman of its board of directors and at least seventy-
five percent of the board itself must be independent from the fund’s invest-
ment adviser.52 The new governance rules also condition exemptions on the 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s release on investment 
company compliance programs, issued more than six months before the mutual fund scandals). 
 49. Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (statement of Lori A. Richards, Director, SEC 
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations); Investment Company Act Rule 38a-1(a)(1), 
17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(1) (2006). See also Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and 
Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714 (Dec. 24, 2003). The rules were effective as of Feb. 4, 
2004, with a delayed compliance date of Oct. 5, 2004. Id. 
 50. Investment Company Act Rule 38a-1(a)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(4), (e) (2006). 
 51. See id. § 270.17j-1(c)(1)(i) (2006); Investment Adviser Code of Ethics, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 2256, 83 SEC Docket 828 (July 2, 2004). Among other things, a code 
of ethics must set forth the standards of business conduct expected of supervisory personnel,  
17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1(a)(1) (2006), and must require “access persons” to report to the adviser 
their personal securities transactions, including transactions in any mutual fund managed by the 
adviser. Id. § 275.204A-1(b). 
 52. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 46,380–81 (Aug. 2, 2004). As of July 2006, both the 75% independent directors condition 
and the independent chairperson condition are in legal limbo. Both conditions were adopted by a 
sharply divided Commission (3–2) and were promptly challenged in a lawsuit filed by the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce. On two separate occasions, the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs. In its first ruling, the D.C. Circuit remanded the rule to the SEC, concluding that the 
SEC had violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by failing to determine the costs of 
these two conditions and by failing to address a proposed alternative to the independent 
chairperson condition. See Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 412 
F.3d 133, 137, 143–45 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The SEC responded by reconsidering the conditions 
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requirements that independent directors hold quarterly “executive sessions” 
separate from the board and that they have the authority to hire staff 
(including independent counsel) to support their oversight responsibilities.53 
The SEC also proposed rules to address the specific problems of market 
timing and late trading. One proposed rule would have imposed a manda-
tory two percent redemption fee on fund shares sales made within five days 
of a purchase.54 However, in response to comments from the industry, the 
SEC ultimately adopted a modified rule that allows—but does not require—
funds to impose such fees.55 To thwart the illegal practice of late trading, 
the SEC proposed a rule that would require all orders for purchases or sales 
of fund shares to be received at the fund by a 4 p.m. EST “hard close.”56 
Opposition to this proposed rule has been intense, however, and the SEC 
appears to be considering alternatives.57 
A final set of rules are aimed at enhancing the disclosures made by 
mutual funds to the investing public. Pursuant to these requirements, mutual 
funds must disclose their policies and procedures with respect to (1) market 
timing, (2) “fair valuation” of their portfolio holdings, and (3) disclosure of 
their portfolio holdings.58 The new rules also significantly expanded the 
information required to be disclosed periodically to mutual fund 
                                                                                                                 
based on the original record, and readopting those conditions by the same sharply divided 3–2 
vote (on virtually the eve of Chairman William Donaldson’s retirement from the Commission, no 
less). The Chamber of Commerce quickly launched a second challenge, and on April 7, 2006, the 
same panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated both conditions, concluding that the SEC’s speedy 
“reconsideration” had violated the APA by failing to afford the opportunity for public comment 
on certain data the Commissioners used in estimating the costs of complying with the two 
conditions. See Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 443 F.3d 890, 
899–908 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In response to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the SEC has sought additional 
comments from the public on both the 75% independent directors condition and the independent 
chairperson condition, and has asked specifically for comment on the costs of complying with 
these conditions and whether these conditions “will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation” as required by Section 2(a) of the 1940 Act. See Investment Company Governance, 
Request for Additional Comment, Investment Company Act Release No. 27395, 71 Fed. Reg. 
35,366 (June 19, 2006). 
 53. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,384–85. 
 54. Mandatory Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,375, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762 (Mar. 11, 2004). 
 55. Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,782, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 13,328 (Mar. 18, 2005). 
 56. Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388 (Dec. 17, 2003). 
 57. See Mutual Funds: A Review of the Regulatory Landscape, Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on 
Financial Services, 109th Cong. 61 (2005) (statement of Meyer Eisenberg, Dir., SEC Div. Inv. 
Mgt.). 
 58. See Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 
Securities Act Release No. 8408, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418, 69 Fed. Reg. 
22,300 (Apr. 23, 2004). 
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shareholders.59 In addition, mutual funds are now required to provide 
enhanced disclosure regarding breakpoint discounts on front-end sales 
loads.60  
b. Enforcement Actions Against Mutual Funds 
The SEC wasted no time stepping up its own enforcement efforts in 
response to Eliot Spitzer’s widely publicized charges of fraud in the mutual 
fund industry.61 As the Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division 
reported to Congress, “immediately following [Spitzer’s] announcement, 
relying on the Commission’s examination powers, the Commission’s staff 
sent detailed information requests to 88 of the largest mutual fund 
complexes in the country and 34 broker dealers . . . [seeking] information 
on each entity’s policies and practices relating to market timing and late 
trading.”62 Many of the responses “warranted aggressive follow-up” 
inspections by SEC examiners and others “led to referrals to the enforce-
ment staff for further investigation.”63 Additional investigations were 
launched based on evidence uncovered through the efforts of both the 
SEC’s enforcement staff and state attorneys general, particularly Spitzer.64 
As of May 2005, the SEC had initiated 29 enforcement actions 
involving fund complexes and their employees (including many of the 
nation’s largest complexes) and 12 enforcement actions involving broker-
dealers and their employees.65 Through settlements with these firms and 
actions filed subsequently, the SEC has collected more than $3.3 billion 
dollars in penalties and disgorgement.66 The SEC intends to distribute this 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of 
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8433, Exchange Act Release No. 49,909, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,485, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798 (June 30, 2004). 
 60. Disclosure of Breakpoint Discounts by Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8427, 
Exchange Act Release No. 49,817, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,464, 69 Fed. Reg. 
33,262 (June 14, 2004). 
 61. For the first of many press releases from the N.Y. State Attorney General’s Office on the 
mutual fund scandals, see Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, 
State Investigation Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud (Sept. 3, 2003), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/ 
2003/sep/sep03a_03.html. The press release announced a $40 million dollar settlement with 
hedge-fund Canary Investment Management LLC for engaging in the practices of late trading and 
market timing in several mutual fund complexes. Spitzer’s complaint against Canary named four 
companies that had permitted such trading: Bank of America Corp., Bank One Corp., Strong 
Capital Management, and Janus Capital Corp. Id. 
 62. Looking Out for Investors Hearing, supra note 9, at 184–85 (statement of Stephen Cutler, 
Director, SEC Division of Enforcement). 
 63. Id. at 185. 
 64. Id. at 180 (describing SEC enforcement efforts relating to mutual fund trading and stating 
that “we are working aggressively . . . in close connection with State regulators, including Mr. 
Spitzer and Mr. Galvin in Massachusetts”). 
 65. See Trading Abuses Hearings, supra note 1, at 38 (statement of Lori A. Richards, Director, 
SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations). 
 66. See Annette L. Nazareth, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Commissioner, Remarks before the ABA 
National Institute on Securities Fraud (Sept. 28, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
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settlement money to mutual fund shareholders who had been harmed by the 
trading abuses.67 In addition to substantial monetary payments and prophy-
lactic relief in the form of cease-and-desist orders or injunctions, the SEC 
settlements contained undertakings that required the firms to improve their 
compliance practices and corporate governance structure.68 
c. Mutual Fund Inspections and Examinations 
Approximately 500 examiners are currently assigned by the OCIE to 
inspect investment companies and investment advisers.69 Prior to the mutual 
fund scandals, the SEC had fewer than 360 examiners.70 Even before the 
scandals broke, a significant number of new hires had been planned from 
the substantial appropriation increases to the SEC’s budget as part of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.71 But the scandals reemphasized the priority 
of enhancing the oversight of mutual funds. 
The addition of these new examiners enabled the OCIE to increase the 
frequency of its examinations: the nation’s largest funds are now scheduled 
for examination at least once every two to three years.72 From 1998-2003, 
the OCIE examined these firms once every five years, and prior to 1998 the 
cycles for examination had been the remarkably long length of once every 
12 to 24 years.73 
                                                                                                                 
speech/2006/spch092806aln.htm [hereinafter Nazareth Remarks]. By way of example, the SEC’s 
case against Bank of America resulted in the payment of $250 million in disgorgement and a civil 
penalty of $125 million. See Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Reaches Agreement in 
Principle to Settle Charges Against Bank of America for Market Timing and Late Trading: Bank 
of America to Pay $375 Million, Exit Mutual Fund Clearing Business, and Make Other Remedial 
Reforms (Mar. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-33.htm. Alliance 
Capital Management agreed to pay $150 million in disgorgement and a civil penalty of $100 
million. See Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Alliance Capital Management Will Pay Record 
$250 Million and Make Significant Governance and Compliance Reforms to Settle SEC Charges: 
Entire Amount Will Be Returned To Investors Who Lost Money Because of Firm’s Illegal Timing 
Arrangements (Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-176.htm. 
Putnam agreed to pay $5 million in disgorgement and $50 million in civil penalties. See Press 
Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Putnam Agrees to Pay $55 Million to Resolve SEC Enforcement 
Action Related to Market Timing by Portfolio Managers, S.E.C. 04-49, 2004 WL 762426 (Apr. 8, 
2004). And for its role in facilitating late trading and market timing of mutual funds by its 
customers and the customers of its introducing brokers, Bear Sterns recently consented to a 
payment of $160 million in disgorgement and $90 million in civil penalties. See Press Release, 
SEC Settles Fraud Charges with Bear Stearns for Late Trading and Market Timing Violations: 
Firm to Pay $250 Million in Disgorgement and Penalties (Mar. 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-38.htm. 
 67. See Nazareth Remarks, supra note 66. 
 68. See GAO Lessons Learned Report, supra note 44, at 25. 
 69. See Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 37 (statement of Lori A. Richards, Director, 
SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. (“[B]udget increases allowed the SEC to increase its staff for fund examinations by a 
third . . . .”). 
 72. Id. at 42. 
 73. Id. 
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The OCIE has also substantially revised its examination techniques to 
improve the staff’s ability to more promptly identify emerging compliance 
problems.74 Specifically, the OCIE has shifted to a “risk-based” 
methodology for examining mutual funds and investment advisers which 
“allows the staff to move more quickly, to be more nimble, and to be more 
responsive to the rapidly changing risk environment in the fund com-
munity.”75 This new risk-based approach focuses routine examinations on 
the nation’s largest funds and other firms posing the greatest compliance 
risks (approximately 200 fund groups and 600 advisers).76 The remaining 
firms are examined “for cause” in sweeps directed at specific risks or 
possible violations across numerous firms, or at random.77 
The OCIE’s new methodology is also credited with making greater use 
of technology and data and increasing the number of interviews during 
examinations in order to better assess a firm’s control or risk environment.78 
Other enhancements include the establishment of “monitoring teams” for 
the largest fund complexes, which allow examiners to become better 
acquainted with the business and operations of a specific complex. In 
addition, OCIE staff examiners work closely with the SEC’s new Office of 
Risk Assessment “to help identify and coordinate areas of risk across the 
agency.”79 
B. PERIODIC CALLS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR REGULATION 
From time to time over many decades, the SEC, Congress, and the 
industry itself has considered the possibility of utilizing private sector 
regulation for mutual funds and/or investment advisers. This section briefly 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See id. at 41–46. See also GAO Lessons Learned Report, supra note 44, at 21 (“Over the 
past 2 years, SEC staff has taken steps to better detect abusive practices in the mutual fund 
industry and plans significant changes to its overall examination program.”). 
 75. See Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 41 (statement of Lori A. Richards, Director, 
SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations). 
 76. See GAO Lessons Learned Report, supra note 44, at 23. 
 77. Id. (“[Examiners will] conduct random inspections of some portion of the remaining 
firms.”). 
 78. See Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 42 (prepared statement of Lori A. Richards, 
Director, SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations). See also GAO Lessons 
Learned Report, supra note 44, at 22 (reporting the OCIE Director’s statement that “interviews 
had begun to play an increased role in assessing companies’ critical risks and control 
environments”). 
 79. Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 42 (statement of Lori A. Richards, Director, SEC 
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations). As described in the GAO report, the duties 
of the Office of Risk Assessment include: 
(1) gathering and maintaining data on new trends and risks from external experts, 
domestic and foreign agencies, surveys, focus groups, and other market data; (2) 
analyzing data to identify and assess new areas of concern across professions, 
companies, industries, and markets; and (3) preparing assessments and forecasts on the 
agency’s risk environment. 
GAO Lessons Learned Report, supra note 44, at 24. 
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examines several proposals relating specifically to the mutual fund industry 
and explores some of the reasons why these proposals have not resulted in 
private regulation.   
1. Proposals from the SEC 
While informal discussions between SEC officials and industry 
participants about private regulation for mutual funds are legion,80 only 
twice—in 198381 and 200382—has the SEC sought public comment on a 
specific proposal for a mutual fund SRO.83 On both occasions the industry 
                                                                                                                 
 80. As far back as the early 1960s, the SEC had begun urging the Investment Company 
Institute to establish itself a self-regulatory organization for mutual funds. See William L. Cary, 
Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A. J. 244, 247 (1963) (“[The SEC and the ICI 
both] agreed on the principle that more inspection of investment companies is called for,” but the 
“industry believed [that the SEC] should perform the inspection,” whereas the SEC “suggested 
that the Institute take the initiative.”). These informal discussions between the SEC and the ICI 
intensified again in the early 1980s. See Will ICI Lend SEC a Hand in Watching Over Industry, 
FUND ACTION, Feb. 7, 2005, at 1 (“When David Ruder was SEC Chairman . . . we came very 
close to making ICI the SRO for funds.” (quoting former ICI President David Silver)). According 
to Silver, it floundered on only one point: the “ICI wanted an assurance the SEC would not give 
that if the Institute took an enforcement action against a fund company the SEC, NASD or the 
states would not jump in with actions of their own.” Id. 
 81. See Utilizing Private Entities, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,044, 68 Fed. Reg. 
7038 (Feb. 23, 1983). 
 82. See Compliance Programs, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,925, [2002–2003 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,827, at 87,177 (Feb. 5, 2003). 
 83. On several occasions during the 20 year period between these proposals, SEC officials 
raised in congressional testimony the possibility of an SRO for funds and/or advisers. See 
Hearings on the Unfair Practice that Exists with Some Financial Planners and the Need for 
Congress to Support the SEC Through Additional Funding and Staffing for Regulation of the 
Financial Planning Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 26 (1992) (testimony of Richard C. Breedan, 
SEC Chairman): 
Another proposal that has been made in the past would be to create an SRO in this area. 
That’s certainly a possibility. When the Commission proposed that a couple of years 
ago, there was a great deal of objection received from a number of groups in the public, 
and frankly, we believe it would be much more expensive than conducting 
examinations through the SEC. 
Id. Proposed Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 127 
(1992) (testimony of Richard C. Breeden, SEC Chairman) (“I would agree that, in concept, [an 
SRO] is something worth looking at . . . . In fact it might be considerably more costly than an SEC 
examination. . . . We would be happy to work with the SRO’s in areas where it made sense, and 
from an overall point of view of economy.”). See also Oversight Hearing on the Mutual Fund 
Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. 12 (1993) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing on the Mutual Fund 
Industry] (testimony of Arthur J. Levitt, SEC Chairman): 
I think, in general, an SRO has proven to be one of the most effective ways of 
monitoring a growing complex of financial services in our society, and it’s a way that I 
am seriously considering with respect to investment companies and even considering 
more seriously with respect to investment advisers. 
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reaction was exceedingly negative.84 Indeed, unlike the broker-dealer 
industry which historically has embraced self-regulation, the mutual fund 
industry has been quite content with direct regulation and examination by 
the SEC.85 
The SEC’s 2003 proposal was significantly broader than the 
“inspection-only” proposal floated twenty years earlier. Couched in the 
Release as one of four potential approaches to increasing private sector 
involvement in the SEC’s regulatory program, the 2003 proposal noted that 
an SRO for mutual funds: 
would function in a manner analogous to the national securities exchanges 
and registered securities associations under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 by (i) establishing business practice rules and ethical standards, (ii) 
conducting routine examinations, (iii) requiring minimum education or 
experience standards, and (iv) bringing its own actions to discipline 
members for violating its rules and the federal securities laws.86  
As with the NASD and the NYSE, any SRO for mutual funds “would 
be subject to the pervasive oversight of the Commission” and the SEC 
“would examine its activities, require it to keep records, and approve its 
rules. . . .”87 But the Release further stated that the “staff would continue to 
examine the activities of funds and advisers, both to ensure adequate 
examination coverage and to provide oversight of the SRO examination 
program.”88 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 84. See infra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
 85. The same is true for the investment adviser and financial planning industries. Despite 
several SEC and congressional proposals to establish one or more SROs for investment advisers, 
none have been adopted. See, e.g., Investment Adviser Self-Regulation Act of 1989, 135 CONG. 
REC. E. 2736 (1989); see also Investment Adviser Reform: Hearing on H.R. 578 Before the 
Subcomm. On Telecomms. And Fin. Of the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 8 
(1993). The possibility of creating one or more SROs for investment advisers also was raised as a 
recommendation in the SEC’s 1963 study of the securities markets. See REPORT OF SPECIAL 
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. 
No. 88-95, pt. 1, at 158–59 (1963). 
  As others have noted, the problem of effectively regulating investment advisers was 
resolved, at least in part, when Congress enacted the National Securities Markets Improvement 
Act of 1996. See FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 24, § 1.02[A][8] (citing National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) 
(codified in scattered sections of the United States Code)). Among other reforms, the Act divided 
jurisdiction over the regulation of investment advisers between the federal government and the 
states: advisers with more than $25 million of assets under management must register with the 
SEC and adhere to federal law whereas advisers managing assets beneath this threshold are 
regulated by the states pursuant to state law. See Paul S. Stevens & Craig S. Tyle, Mutual Funds, 
Investment Advisers, and the National Securities Markets Improvement Act, 52 BUS. LAW. 419, 
443 (1997). 
 86. Compliance Programs, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 87,183. 
 87. Id. at 87,184. 
 88. Id. 
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The impetus for the 2003 proposal was the SEC’s lack of adequate 
resources, notwithstanding the anticipated substantial increase to the SEC’s 
budget.89 In fact, the Release went so far as to predict that “even if we are 
able to substantially expand our examination staff, it is unlikely that future 
growth in our resources will ever keep pace with future growth of 
investment advisers and investment companies.”90 It bears noting that the 
2003 proposal was released for comment in February 2003, more than six 
months before the revelation of the market timing and late trading scandals 
that prompted congressional hearings and demands for change. 
Industry participants and representatives of the investing public, with 
very few exceptions, were vehemently opposed to the 2003 proposal. Most 
commentators questioned the need for change, highlighting the SEC’s 
success with direct regulation and examination of funds91 and pointing to 
the mutual fund industry’s proud “record of compliance with both the letter 
and the spirit of the securities laws.”92 Commentators were also concerned 
that the establishment of an SRO for mutual funds would create 
“inconsistent and fragmented layers of regulation”93 and that “forming and 
operating an SRO would be extremely costly” with such costs ultimately to 
be borne by investors.94 Others bemoaned that self-regulation “would 
require funds to pay twice, once to the Commission and once to an SRO, 
for essentially the same amount of oversight they receive today.”95 
The 1983 proposal was developed in a manner similar to the 2003 
proposal and met with a similar fate. After more than twenty years of back 
and forth discussions between SEC officials and industry participants,96 in 
February 1983 the SEC issued a release seeking public comment on the 
concept of utilizing the private sector to perform routine inspections of 
                                                                                                                 
 89. See id. at 87,182. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Letter from Craig S. Tyle, Gen. Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to Jonathan 
G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 17, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s70303/s70303-15.pdf (“It bears emphasizing that the current system of Commission oversight of 
mutual funds has worked exceptionally well for more than sixty years.”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Letter from David Riggs, Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Charles Schwab & Co., 
Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC, Proposed Rule: Compliance Programs of Investment 
Companies and Investment Advisers 5 (Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s70303/charlesschwab042303.htm. 
 94. Hester Peirce, Div. Inv. Mgmt., Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and 
Investment Advisors: Summary of Contents on Proposed New Rules 38a-1 Under the Investment 
Company Act and 206(4)-7 Under the Investment Advisors Act, and Proposed Amendments to 
Rule 204-2 Under the Investment Advisers Act (Nov. 20, 2003), available at 
www.sec.gov/rules/extra/s70303summary.pdf. 
 95. Letter from Heidi Stam, Principal, Sec. Regulation, Vanguard Group, to Jonathan G. Katz, 
Sec’y, SEC 6 (Apr. 16, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70303/vanguard 
041603.htm (“Requiring Commission staff to continue to examine funds and advisers, with the 
additional burden of overseeing an SRO, ultimately would weaken rather than strengthen the 
Commission’s ability to effectively oversee funds and advisers.”). 
 96. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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mutual funds and other investment companies.97 After highlighting the 
industry’s “dramatic growth” and lamenting the “budgetary constraints that 
prevent the allocation of greater staff resources to the investment company 
examination program,”98 the release sought guidance on a number of alter-
natives, including the possibility of creating one or more SROs to conduct 
routine periodic inspections of investment companies.99 Under this alter-
native, the SRO would have the “limited function of conducting exam-
inations of investment companies which elect to participate in such an 
examination program, and making the results of those examinations avail-
able to the Commission.”100 But even with this limited function, an SRO for 
the purpose of inspecting mutual funds lacked the necessary support from 
the industry. 
The comments from the mutual fund industry in response to the SEC’s 
proposals, particularly the 2003 proposal, reflect the industry’s concerns 
with the costs of private regulation and the fragmentation that could result 
from concurrent private and public regulation. Some observers might argue 
that the industry is well aware that the SEC’s budget has not kept pace with 
the explosive growth of mutual funds and that the industry prefers to be 
regulated by an entity that is strapped for resources. But cutting against this 
explanation for its reticence to private regulation is the industry’s traditional 
support in Congress for increased SEC appropriations for mutual fund 
oversight.101 
Another explanation for the reticence may be that the mutual fund 
industry places a high value on its ability to advertise itself as “regulated by 
the SEC.”102 As Professor Tamar Frankel has observed: 
Regulation offers issuers and institutions government support in their 
efforts to gain investors’ trust in the financial markets. Just as it is difficult 
to validate the trustworthiness of these institutions, it is also very costly 
for the institutions to convince investors of their trustworthiness. 
Regulation reduces the institutions’ costs. Regulation also helps to restrain 
the “bad apples” that may ruin confidence in the industry; a few 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Concept of Utilizing Private Entities in Investment Company Examinations and Imposing 
Examination Fees, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,044, 48 Fed. Reg. 8485 (Feb. 23, 
1983). 
 98. Id. at 8486. 
 99. Id. at 8486–87. 
 100. Id. at 8487. 
 101. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on the Mutual Fund Industry, supra note 83, at 95 (statement 
of Matthew P. Fink, President, Investment Company Institute) (“[The ICI] has for years supported 
increased funding for the SEC (and for the Division of Investment Management in particular), so 
that the highly effective regulation that the mutual fund industry has experienced to date will be 
assured in the future.”). 
 102. Cf. Tamar Frankel, Regulation and Investors Trust in the Securities Markets, 68 BROOK. L. 
REV. 439, 442 (2002). Small investment advisers “vehemently opposed” legislation curtailing 
federal regulation because “[t]hey wanted to continue to advertise themselves as ‘Regulated by the 
SEC,’ which they valued more than the advertising of ‘Regulated by State X.’” Id. 
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untrustworthy members may spoil the reputation for trustworthiness for all 
industry members. Regulation provides the industry with the stamp of 
“good housekeeping.” It implies that the government guards investors’ 
interests, and reduces the very high costs that investors would otherwise 
bear in monitoring the issuers and the institutions.103 
Earning a “good housekeeping” stamp from the SEC may well be 
significantly more valuable to the mutual fund industry than a “good 
housekeeping stamp” from an SRO. 
2. Congressional Proposals 
After decades of listening to the SEC’s repeated warnings of inadequate 
resources in the area of mutual fund regulation,104 in the wake of the market 
timing and late trading mutual fund scandals, Congress was jolted into 
action. The result was a series of oversight hearings and a flurry of bills, 
with some bills proposing new regulations as well as the creation of a 
“Mutual Fund Oversight Board” modeled on the recently created PCAOB. 
Due in part to the upcoming 2004 presidential election, a bill jointly 
sponsored by Senators John Kerry, Edward Kennedy, and Thomas 
Daschle—The Mutual Fund Protection Act of 2003—drew substantial 
attention from the media and financial press. The bill called for the 
congressional creation of a not-for-profit corporation—the Mutual Fund 
Oversight Board—which “shall not be an agency or establishment of the 
United States Government.”105 As envisioned, it would have possessed 
registration, investigation, disciplinary, and rulemaking authority over 
mutual fund directors.106 The Board’s members would have been selected 
by the SEC,107 and it would have been funded by assessments against 
mutual fund assets or management fees.108 Providing the rationale for its 
creation, Senator Kerry maintained:   
The actions by the SEC show that it is incapable of protecting investors 
from securities fraud by mutual fund companies and will not prosecute 
this type of fraud to the full extent of the law. Therefore, we must take the 
day-to-day oversight of mutual funds away from the SEC and develop a 
new Mutual Fund Oversight Board to provide oversight, examination and 
enforcement of mutual funds. This new board will be similar to the Public 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on the Mutual Fund Industry, supra note 83, at 7–12 
(statement of Arthur J. Levitt, SEC Chairman); Mutual Fund Industry Hearing, supra note 3, at 
134–37. 
 105. Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act of 2003, S. 1958, 108th Cong. § 201(b), 149 CONG. 
REC. 15,977, 15,984 (2003). Much of the text of the provisions creating the Board was drawn 
verbatim from Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which created the PCAOB. See infra notes 113–
121 and accompanying text. 
 106. Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act §§ 202−205 (2003). 
 107. Id. § 201(e)(3). 
 108. Id. § 207(d)(1)–(2). 
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Company Accounting Oversight Board developed in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.109 
The Kerry-Kennedy-Daschle bill, along with a number of other bills on 
the subject of mutual fund reform, failed to proceed very far in Congress.110 
To be sure, the demand for reform was high.111 But as recounted above, the 
SEC managed to put forth a convincing case that it was focused on the 
problems in the mutual fund industry and was proceeding down a path of 
substantial change.    
II. AN ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE SECTOR REGULATION FOR 
THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 
Private regulation for the securities industry pre-dates the creation of 
the SEC by almost 150 years.112 Until very recently, this private regulation 
took the form of self-regulation under SEC oversight, whereby broker-
dealers trading on exchanges, and later in the over-the counter market, 
agreed to comply with detailed rules and principles of fair dealing 
promulgated by the industry. With the creation of the PCAOB, however, 
another type of private regulation was born: so-called “independent” private 
regulation. This part explores both types of regulation and concludes that 
neither constitutes an appropriate model for the mutual fund industry. 
A. INDEPENDENT PRIVATE REGULATION: THE PCAOB MODEL 
1. The Structure and Responsibilities of the PCAOB 
Congress created the PCAOB in July 2002 as the centerpiece of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.113 The PCAOB’s principal mission was to restore 
investor confidence by preventing the types of accounting scandals that 
resulted in the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, and numerous other 
companies in 2001 and 2002.114 
                                                                                                                 
 109. 149 CONG. REC. S15,984 (Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kerry), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2003_record&page=S15881& 
position=all. 
 110. See supra note 15; see also Tracking of the Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act of 2003, 
S. 1958, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s108-
1958 (noting that the bill was introduced in Congress on November 25, 2003, and the last action 
on the bill was December 9, 2003). 
 111. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 112. See infra text accompanying note 148. 
 113. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 114. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (Supp. II 2002); see also PCAOB, 2003 Annual Report at 5, 
http://www.pcaobus.org/about_the_pcaob/annual_reports/2003.pdf [hereinafter PCAOB 2003 
Annual Report]. 
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As part of this congressionally-designed crackdown, Title I of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act115 charged the ostensibly private PCAOB116 with the 
broad responsibility of overseeing the audits of public companies (rendering 
the PCAOB as the auditor’s auditor). Specifically, the legislation provided 
that the PCAOB shall: register accounting firms that audit public 
companies;117 enact rules setting standards for auditing, quality control, 
ethics, and independence;118 inspect on a yearly basis the nation’s largest 
accounting firms and inspect other firms at least once every three years;119 
investigate possible violations of PCAOB rules or the federal securities 
laws by accounting firms and their associated persons;120 and impose 
discipline for established violations through a range of sanctions including 
censures, temporary suspensions, permanent bars, and substantial monetary 
fines.121 
Congress also charged the SEC with ultimate oversight of the PCAOB 
(rendering the SEC, in a manner of speaking, the auditor of the auditor’s 
auditor). Specifically, the SEC appoints the PCAOB’s Chairperson and its 
four other members (who can only be removed for cause);122 approves the 
PCAOB’s budget;123 approves any rules adopted by the PCAOB;124 and 
retains review power over any disciplinary actions taken by the PCAOB.125 
The PCAOB was deemed fully operational by the SEC on April 25, 
2003.126 Since that time, the PCAOB has grown into an organization with 
approximately 450 employees in Washington, D.C. and seven regional 
offices, and an operating budget of $130.5 million for fiscal year 2006.127 
Congress provided that its primary source of funding—often referred to as 
“private sector funding”—was to come from the “accounting support fees” 
that the PCAOB was authorized to levy on public companies in accordance 
with a formula based on market capitalization.128 
                                                                                                                 
 115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–7219 (Supp. II 2002). 
 116. Title I provides that “[t]he Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the United 
States Government,” and that “[n]o member or person employed by, or agent for, the Board shall 
be deemed to be an officer or employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such 
service.” Id. § 7211(b). 
 117. Id. § 7211(a). 
 118. Id. § 7211(c)(2). 
 119. Id. § 7214(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
 120. Id. § 7211(c)(4). 
 121. Id. § 7215(c)(4)(A)–(D). 
 122. Id. § 7211(e)(4), (6) 
 123. Id. § 7219(b). 
 124. Id. § 7217(b)(2). 
 125. Id. § 7217(c)(2). 
 126. PCAOB, 2003 Annual Report, supra note 114, at 5. 
 127. PCAOB: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2006 Budget 5, 
http://www.pcaobus.org/About_the_PCAOB/Budget_Presentations/2006.pdf. 
 128. 15 U.S.C. § 7219(c)(1), (g). 
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2. Should an Independent Oversight Board be Established for 
Mutual Funds? 
I have argued previously that the decision to create the PCAOB as a 
private entity was profoundly unwise, both for doctrinal reasons as well as 
normative ones.129 To be sure, the accounting profession was sorely in need 
of restructured regulation and Congress was right to take up that task. But 
Congress’s resort to the legal fiction that the PCAOB is a private 
corporation jeopardizes the PCAOB’s ability to fulfill its role as the 
accounting industry’s principal regulator. 
Prior Supreme Court precedent makes very clear that, for purposes of 
the U.S. Constitution, the PCAOB is part of the federal government 
notwithstanding its congressional designation as a private corporation. The 
decision most directly on point is Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger 
Corp.,130 where the Court set forth a three prong test for determining 
whether an ostensibly private entity is actually part of the “Government 
itself.”131 Under Lebron, when (1) “the Government creates a corporation 
by special law,” (2) “for the furtherance of governmental objectives,” and 
(3) “retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the 
directors of that corporation,” that “corporation is part of the Government,” 
at least for purposes of constitutional law.132 Thus, federal courts—
including one at this very moment in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia133—must now grapple with whether the PCAOB’s structure 
comports with the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of 
powers. And even if these threshold issues are resolved in the PCAOB’s 
favor, other challenges against the constitutionality of the PCAOB’s actions 
will invariably follow.134 
Congress’s decision to create the PCAOB as a private corporation is 
also troubling from a policy perspective. As a private entity, even one that 
is subject to SEC oversight, the PCAOB is less publicly accountable, its 
operations are less transparent, and its policymaking is less legitimate than 
its federal regulatory counterparts.135 Moreover, the PCAOB’s status as a 
private corporation raises, rather than lowers, the overall costs of its 
regulatory program. Had the PCAOB been established as a federal entity, it 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See Nagy, supra note 9, at 1048–57, 1061–69. 
 130. 513 U.S. 374 (1995). In Lebron, an 8–1 majority of the Supreme Court held that Amtrak 
was part of the federal government, notwithstanding Congress’ statutory declaration that it is a 
private corporation and “not . . . an agency or establishment of the United States Government.” Id. 
at 391. 
 131. Id. at 397. 
 132. Id. at 400. 
 133. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 1:06-cv-00217-JR, 
2006 WL 645100 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2006). 
 134. See Nagy, supra note 9, at 1044. 
 135. See id. at 1062–66. 
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could be operating more cost effectively, in part because the compensation 
to its members and staff likely would have been less.136   
My opinion about the appropriateness of the PCAOB model for the 
mutual fund industry should therefore come as no surprise: Congress should 
not compound its mistake in creating the PCAOB as a private corporation 
by establishing a new centaur-like entity for the mutual fund industry. Such 
an entity would surely fall prey to the same constitutional challenges and 
policy indictments currently being launched at the PCAOB. 
3. The Road Not Taken—Independent Government Regulation 
At the congressional hearings that preceded the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, U.S. Comptroller General David Walker testified that 
while there were “several alternative structures” from which Congress 
could choose in establishing a new regulator for the accounting industry, 
the one that he favored would have created “an independent government 
entity within the SEC.”137 His second favored alternative, possibly modeled 
on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal 
Reserve, would have created “an independent government agency outside 
the SEC.”138 He did not favor the creation of “a non-governmental private-
sector entity overseen by the SEC” because such a “body would have less 
direct accountability to the Congress and the public than a body with board 
members who are PASs [president appointed confirmed by the Senate].”139 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Of course, some would argue that the regulator for the accounting industry “needed” to be 
private because the regulator “needed” to pay private-sector salaries to attract highly qualified 
board members and staff. See, e.g., The Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, 
Securities & Financial Law, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 583 (2004). 
We were created as a not-for-profit corporation largely so the PCAOB could pay better 
than government. . . . [Members of Congress] realized that they were piling an immense 
responsibility on a startup, and so one of the things they figured out is you’re going to 
have to pay people better than the government can pay . . . . 
Id. (quoting William McDonough, PCAOB Chairman); see also Nagy, supra note 9, at 1069 n.501 
(citing additional sources). But a sufficient number of talented accountants and lawyers may well 
have been eager to sign on with a new public sector regulator for the accounting industry, and a 
pay scale on par with the SEC or federal banking regulators may not have dissuaded them. 
Furthermore, even if there were a legitimate need for the accounting regulator to pay wages above 
those paid by the SEC and the federal bank regulators, no structural impediment would have 
prevented Congress from authorizing the disparity. The only barriers were political, not legal. See 
id. at 1068–69. 
 137. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: STATUS OF PANEL ON 
AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE THE SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM, 
REP. NO. GAO-02-411, at 79 (May 2002) (Letter from David M. Walker, U.S. Comptroller Gen., 
to Hon. Paul Sarbanes, Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. 
Senate 5 (May 3, 2002)), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02411.pdf. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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He also expressed concern that a private sector entity “would increase the 
SEC’s responsibility as well as its workload.”140 
Short of a Supreme Court decision invalidating the PCAOB’s current 
structure as unconstitutional, however, there is little reason to expect 
Congress to revisit this issue and recreate the PCAOB as an independent 
government regulator. That reality is unfortunate because the road not taken 
would have led to a stronger PCAOB that was more aligned with 
democratic values. 
The possibility of independent government regulation remains open for 
the mutual fund industry. Yet a path down that road would make little 
sense. In the case of accounting, the creation of an entirely new entity was 
warranted because the SEC did not have a long and established tradition of 
inspecting and regulating the practice of auditing, and the need to replace 
the prior system of self-regulation was clear.141 Mutual funds, in contrast, 
have been inspected and regulated by the SEC for the last 65 years, with 
notable success and only infrequent criticism.142 In light of that experience, 
it is difficult to see how a new federal regulator could oversee the mutual 
fund industry any more efficiently or effectively with the same expenditure 
of resources. 
Moreover, to the extent that the SEC’s shortcomings in regulating 
mutual funds can be attributed to agency capture, the potential for capture 
would only be increased in a newly created federal agency designed to 
focus exclusively on the regulation of the mutual fund industry. Indeed, as 
others have noted, “a well-known empirical regularity is that single industry 
regulators are typically more prone to capture than [multi]–industry 
regulators.”143 
B. SELF-REGULATION: THE NASD AND NYSE MODEL  
1. Self-Regulation as Distinguished from the PCAOB 
The recent litigation challenging the constitutionality of the PCAOB 
has focused renewed attention on the structural similarities between the 
PCAOB and the NASD and NYSE, and has prompted some to question 
whether a determination that the PCAOB is part of the federal government 
would jeopardize the legal status of these SROs.144 To be sure, as the SEC 
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 141. See Nagy, supra note 9, at 984. 
 142. See Birdthistle, supra note 6, at 1408. 
 143. Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 61 (testimony of Eric W. Zitzewitz, Stanford 
Graduate School of Business). For an extensive overview of capture theory and the debates 
surrounding it, see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54–73 (1992). 
 144. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Is the PCAOB Unconstitutional?, 235 N.Y.L.J. 5 (2006). 
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tacitly acknowledged in The Matter of Frank Quattrone,145 the NASD and 
the NYSE’s close entwinement with the SEC raises legitimate questions as 
to whether some SRO actions should be deemed “state action” for purposes 
of the Constitution.146 But under the Supreme Court’s decision in Lebron, 
neither the NASD nor the NYSE should be deemed the “government itself.” 
Taking the three prongs of the test in Lebron,147 we can see why this is so. 
Focusing on the first prong, neither the NASD nor the NYSE were 
“created” by Congress. Although Congress created a scheme of statutory 
self-regulation pursuant to which both entities are afforded certain quasi-
government powers, both the NASD and the NYSE were formed by 
members of the industry they regulate—the “self” in self-regulation. The 
NYSE was established in 1792 when a group of securities brokers signed 
the “Buttonwood Agreement.”148 The NASD can trace its roots back to 
1912 when a group of investment bankers formed the Investment Bankers 
Association of America (IBA).149 In contrast, the PCAOB owes its entire 
                                                                                                                 
 145. In the Matter of Frank P. Quattrone, Exchange Act Release No. 53,547 (Mar. 24, 2006), 
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Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935), which declared the NIRA 
unconstitutional. Most investment bankers “continued to adhere to the code voluntarily,” and in 
1936, the IBCC (which reorganized itself informally as the Investment Bankers Conference 
Committee (the “Conference Committee”)) began working with the SEC “to establish a new, 
permanent nationwide organization under the SEC.” CAROSSO, supra, at 389. According to 
Carosso, the Conference Committee’s “most important contribution was to draft the legislation 
subsequently passed as the Maloney Act.” Id. at 390. The Maloney Act added Section 15A to the 
Exchange Act, specifying the criteria pursuant to which the SEC may register “national securities 
associations” with rulemaking, investigative, and enforcement authority over their members. After 
the Maloney Act’s passage in 1938, the Conference Committee again reorganized to form the 
NASD, and in August 1939, the SEC formally registered the NASD as the nation’s first, and until 
the recent registration of the National Futures Association, only national securities association. 
See, e.g., Robert Glauber, Chairman and CEO, NASD, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., U.S. H.R. Hearing 
on Self-Regulatory Organizations: Exploring the Need for Reform 1 (Nov. 17, 2005), available at 
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existence and structure to Congress.150 That is, as previously noted, 
Congress designed the PCAOB and specified that it was to have five 
members; Congress imposed for PCAOB members a limit of two terms; 
Congress protected PCAOB members from removal except by the SEC 
(and then only for good cause); and Congress assigned the PCAOB its very 
specific oversight responsibilities. Moreover, to separate the PCAOB 
further from its self-regulatory cousins, Congress specifically provided that 
no more than two CPAs can serve as members at any one time.151 
Skipping to the third prong of the Lebron test, it is also clear that 
neither the NASD nor the NYSE are controlled by a board that is appointed 
by the government. Both entities select their own boards and the 
government plays no role in the appointment of NASD or NYSE 
directors.152 In stark contrast, the SEC appoints the PCAOB’s board (after 
consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of 
the Treasury) and only the SEC can remove PCAOB members—and then 
only for cause. 
Some courts applying the Lebron test also look to government funding 
of an ostensibly private entity as an additional indicia of governmental 
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an alternative bill that was drafted by Congressman Michael Oxley. See Corporate and Auditing 
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002), 
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Call 110, Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act, H.R. 3763 (Apr. 24, 
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of a Senate bill proposed by Senator Paul Sarbanes, the Oxley bill would have permitted the SEC 
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organization. But the PCAOB was a congressionally-created independent regulation—it is not a 
self-regulator. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 151. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(2) (Supp. II 2002). 
 152. In December 2004, the SEC released for public comment proposed rules that would have 
required registered “national securities exchanges” and registered “national securities 
associations” to have a governing board “composed of a majority of independent directors, with 
key board committees to be composed solely of independent directors.” Fair Administration and 
Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 50,699, 69 Fed. Reg. 
71,126 at 71,133 (Dec. 8, 2004). The proposed rules would also require these SROs to separate, 
either structurally or functionally, their regulatory operations from their market operations and 
other commercial interests. Id. at 71,141–43. Although the SEC has not adopted these proposals as 
rules, both the NASD and the NYSE have adopted structural changes that would bring the SROs 
more in line with these proposals. See, e.g., NYSE Supports Targeted Improvements to  
Self Regulation (April 2005), http://www.nyse.com/about/publication/1113302997067.html; 
Testimony of Robert Glauber, NASD Chairman and CEO, supra note 149, at 2–3. 
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control.153 But here again we see a significant difference between the 
NASD/NYSE and the PCAOB: both the NASD and the NYSE receive their 
funding from the members they regulate, whereas the PCAOB’s funding 
stems from a congressional mandate effectively requiring public companies 
to pay “accounting support fees.”154 Thus, even if the “government control” 
prong of the Lebron test is viewed more flexibly,155 it is highly unlikely that 
a court would deem either the NYSE or the NASD as an entity “controlled” 
by the government. 
Returning to the second prong under Lebron, there is certainly no 
denying that Congress vested the NASD and the NYSE with government-
like rulemaking, investigative and disciplinary powers and that these SROs, 
in the words of Lebron, further important “governmental objectives.”156 But 
while a necessary condition, that is hardly sufficient to deem an entity the 
government itself. Indeed, if furthering important “governmental 
objectives” were the sine qua non of a public entity, than a host of services 
frequently “contracted out” by the government—including education, 
medical care, transportation, and insurance—would be forever removed 
from the private sector. 
The government-like rulemaking, investigative and disciplinary powers 
of the NASD and NYSE do, however, make these entities susceptible to 
constitutional challenges on the ground that their actions constitute “state 
action” under Supreme Court precedents.157 Such challenges have in the 
past been met with mixed success.158 
                                                                                                                 
 153. See, e.g., Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Cooperative Extension of Schenectady County, 252 
F.3d 545, 552–53 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding in dicta that the state-created and state funded 
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 154. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7219(c)(1), (g) (Supp. II 2002). 
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REV. 302 (1995); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 
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 158. Compare Villani v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 
(“It is now beyond dispute that the Fifth Amendment due process requirements as to federal action 
2006] Regulating the Mutual Fund Industry 37 
2. Should an SRO be Established for Mutual Funds? 
Having drawn the distinction between the PCAOB (an ostensibly 
private independent regulatory body) and the NASD and NYSE (private 
self-regulatory bodies), we can now explore the question of whether an 
SRO modeled on the NASD or NYSE should be established for the mutual 
fund industry. Although self-regulation under SEC oversight has worked 
reasonably well for the broker-dealer industry,159 such a self-regulatory 
system should not be established for mutual funds.160 
Many of the arguments against the creation of an SRO for mutual funds 
relate to the well-recognized weaknesses inherent to any system of self-
regulation. As a congressional committee observed more than 30 years ago: 
The inherent limitations in allowing an industry to regulate itself are well 
known: the natural lack of enthusiasm for regulation on the part of the 
group to be regulated, the temptation to use a facade of industry regulation 
as a shield to ward off more meaningful regulation, the tendency for 
businessmen to use collective action to advance their interests through the 
imposition of purely anticompetitive restraints as opposed to those 
justified by regulatory needs, and a resistance to changes in the regulatory 
pattern because of vested economic interests in its preservation.161  
With respect to broker-dealers, both Congress and the SEC have 
determined that these disadvantages are outweighed by the benefits of self-
regulation. Among other benefits: 
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For articles analyzing whether constitutional protections should apply to SRO disciplinary actions, 
see William I. Friedman, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction Among 
Securities Regulators in the U.S. Marketplace—Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 727 
(2004); Richard L. Stone & Michael Perino, Not Just a Private Club: Self Regulatory 
Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing Federal Law, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 453 
(1995). 
 159. But as the SEC itself recognized in its 2004 Concept Release on self-regulation, “recent 
failings or perceived failings with respect to SROs fulfilling their self-regulatory obligations have 
sparked public debate as to the efficacy of the SRO system in general.” Concept Release 
Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,257 
(Dec. 8, 2004). 
 160. For additional scholarly commentary on this question, see Seligman, supra note 8, at 
1120–26 and Frankel, supra note 8, at 448–50. 
 161. Staff of S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., Report of the 
Subcomm. on Securities (Comm. Print 1973), quoted in Seligman, supra note 8, at 1120. 
38 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 1 
The expertness and immediacy of self-regulation often provide the most 
expedient and practical means for regulation. By making those regulated 
actual participants in the regulatory process they become more aware of 
the goals of regulation and their own stake in it. In some areas the self-
regulatory bodies can promote adherence to ethical standards beyond 
those which could be established as a matter of law.162  
But for a variety of reasons, the calculus performed for the broker-
dealer industry would not yield the same result for the mutual fund industry. 
Indeed, for mutual funds, the benefits of self-regulation would be far less 
meaningful and the disadvantages would be substantially greater. 
As Part I of this article has demonstrated, mutual funds already operate 
under a highly specific and demanding system of statutory regulation that 
has been in existence for more than 65 years. That was not the case for 
broker-dealers when Congress opted to delegate substantial rulemaking, 
investigative, and disciplinary authority to the stock exchanges in 1934 and 
to the NASD in 1939.163 Thus, SROs operating under SEC oversight spared 
the SEC and Congress much heavy lifting in the area of broker-dealer 
regulation. In the case of mutual funds, however, the heavy lifting has 
already been done by the government. It is impossible to turn back the 
clock to recapture that significant self-regulatory advantage. 
An SRO for mutual funds also cannot be justified as a cost-savings 
measure. As the mutual fund industry has been quick to point out, the 
creation of an SRO would be tremendously expensive and the SRO’s 
funding would in all likelihood have to come—directly or indirectly—from 
mutual fund shareholders.164 Such membership fees to the SRO would be 
on top of the substantial registration and filing fees already paid to the SEC 
by funds and advisers.165 The SEC, in turn, would face the added cost of 
overseeing this new SRO. And given the SEC’s statement in its 2003 
proposal that its “staff would continue to examine the activities of funds 
and advisers,”166 there would be little reason to expect a significant 
offsetting reduction in the SEC’s present costs of mutual fund regulation. 
Moreover, the self-regulatory promise of higher standards of ethical 
behavior holds less value in the mutual fund industry, where the securities 
law itself demands a very high standard of conduct. Unlike broker-dealers 
who generally deal in arms-length transactions with their customers and 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 722 (1963). 
 163. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
 165. But cf. Seligman, supra note 8, at 1126 (expounding the benefits of an SRO for mutual 
funds, but acknowledging that whether they are worth the costs is an empirical question meriting 
serious study). 
 166. See Compliance Programs, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,925, [2002–2003 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,827, at 87,184 (Feb. 5, 2003). 
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other broker-dealers,167 investment companies and their investment advisers 
owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders who entrust their money to mutual 
funds.168 The critical question then is who is better positioned to ensure that 
the mutual fund industry adheres to those very high standards—the SEC or 
the industry itself?   
There should be little doubt that, as the federal agency charged with the 
responsibility of protecting investors, the SEC would be far more effective 
than the industry in ensuring that mutual funds and their advisers adhere to 
the very high standards of conduct proscribed by the law. A mutual fund 
SRO would suffer from the same inherent conflicts of interest that occur 
whenever an industry has principal responsibility for overseeing the policies 
and practices of its members. But the creation of a mutual fund SRO laden 
with these conflicts is particularly troubling because mutual funds already 
operate under a built-in conflict resulting from their management by 
affiliated investment advisers.169 Although SEC officials (not to mention 
members of Congress) may be susceptible to pressure from the mutual fund 
industry to lessen the burdens of regulation and enforcement, that pressure 
does not even come close to the daily conflicts that would be faced by 
regulators selected by and responsible to the firms that are members of the 
SRO. 
The SEC would also be less likely to promulgate rules aimed 
specifically to discourage competition. In contrast, a mutual fund SRO may 
frequently be tempted to use its control over membership to thwart compe-
tition. Although the tendency toward anti-competitive behavior is a general 
weakness of self-regulation,170 that concern is exacerbated in the context of 
mutual fund regulation because of the industry’s relatively low start-up 
costs and barriers to entry.171 
A final reason for opposing the creation of an SRO for mutual funds is 
the very practical issue of timing. The mutual fund reforms undertaken by 
                                                                                                                 
 167. See Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisors—What’s in a Name?, 11 FORD. J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 31, 36 (2005) (“A broker-dealer’s relationship with his customers is not, however, generally 
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 168. See FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 24, § 1.02[A][3] (“[B]oth the Advisers Act and the 
1940 Act are based on the central premise that investment advisers are fiduciaries of their 
clients.”). 
 169. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 476, 480 (1970) (observing that the 1940 Act responded to 
Congress’s “concern[ ] about the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment 
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 170. See generally Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the 
Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 
475, 487 (1984). 
 171. See The Mutual Fund Summit Transcript, 73 MISS. L.J. 1153, 1157 (2004) (emphasizing 
that the investment company industry is one “that has very low barriers to entry, many new 
entrants and a great deal of competition” (quoting Paul Hagga, former Chairman of the Investment 
Company Institute)). 
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the SEC in the wake of the trading abuse scandals have not been in place 
for long and their effectiveness is still being evaluated. A drastic change in 
the course of mutual fund regulation might undermine the investor 
confidence that both the SEC and the industry itself has been working 
diligently to restore.172 
III. TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF MUTUAL 
FUNDS 
What then, if anything, can be done to improve the way in which 
mutual funds are regulated? This final Part offers several suggestions. The 
first constitutes a somewhat ambitious undertaking that would require 
congressional action. But three more modest recommendations are also 
advanced. 
A. AN EXPANDED AND ENHANCED SEC 
Assuming that further study demonstrates the desirability of more 
frequent and/or more comprehensive inspections for mutual funds and their 
advisers, one possibility would be for Congress to infuse the SEC with 
additional resources to accomplish that end. Such additional funding could 
bring the SEC more in line with the substantially lower examiner-to-assets 
ratios, and the examiner-to-entity ratios, that exist for federal bank 
regulators such as the Federal Reserve and FDIC.173 This observation 
should not be viewed as an argument for complete parity with federal bank 
regulator ratios. To be sure, many experts contend that the U.S. banking 
industry is substantially over-regulated.174 But in light of the sheer volume 
of money currently invested in mutual funds,175 a forceful argument can be 
                                                                                                                 
 172. See Frankel, supra note 8, at 455 (“[D]ifferent, untested scheme of regulation” for mutual 
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 173. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY: SEC’S REVISED 
EXAMINATION APPROACH OFFERS POTENTIAL BENEFITS, BUT SIGNIFICANT OVERSIGHT 
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Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 521, 2005), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/ 
programs/olin%5Fcenter/papers/pdf/Jackson_521.pdf (“[O]ne area in which U.S. regulatory 
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 175. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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made that the current system of inspection should be expanded and 
enhanced. 
Assuming an expanded and enhanced SEC mutual fund inspection 
program is warranted, the additional monies to the SEC need not come from 
general federal appropriations. Rather, following the “full cost recovery” 
model of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, Congress could authorize the 
SEC to retain the registration and filing fees that currently are paid by 
mutual funds and their advisers and, if necessary to fund the enhanced 
program, could authorize higher fees.176 Although Congress has rejected 
self-funding proposals for the SEC in the past,177 this proposal would be on 
a more limited scale and would preserve for Congress much of its coveted 
control over the SEC’s budget. 
Alternatively, Congress could authorize the SEC to charge mutual 
funds or their advisers for the cost (or partial costs) of enhanced inspections 
and examinations. Although these charges may be passed along to fund 
shareholders in the form of reduced profits, the cost of an enhanced SEC 
inspection program would be substantially lower than the creation of an 
entirely new federal regulatory entity or a new self-regulator along the lines 
of the NASD and NYSE. 
B. OTHER REFORMS 
1. Heightened Enforcement of Duties for Mutual Fund 
Directors 
Many scholars have emphasized that the trading abuse scandals 
reflected a systemic failure of oversight by mutual fund boards.178 Although 
the SEC has enacted a number of new rules to strengthen the oversight role 
of mutual fund boards,179 the SEC can and should do a better job of holding 
mutual fund directors to their statutory responsibilities. 
In particular, the SEC should set forth clearer standards regarding the 
minimal level of diligence that independent directors must demonstrate to 
                                                                                                                 
 176. In May 2006, the SEC announced that the registration and transaction fees charged to 
securities issues and other parties will be reduced by $1 billion in the fiscal year that begins 
October 1. See SEC Press Release 2006-64, SEC Announces Billion Dollar Fee Cut to Benefit 
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 177. See Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. 
REV. 233, 233, 246–49, 253–56 (2004). 
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fulfill their role as “watchdogs” of the management of mutual funds.180 As 
Professor Alan Palmiter points out in his article for this Symposium, a 
comprehensive specification of board duties is noticeably absent from the 
`40 Act, and thus it is generally state, rather than federal, law that 
determines whether mutual fund directors are fulfilling their duties to 
shareholders.181 But certain oversight and monitoring responsibilities—such 
as those involving fund fees and performance as well as the pricing of 
portfolio securities—are duties which are specifically set out in the `40 Act 
and its rules and regulations.182 If SEC officials articulated their 
expectations for independent directors more clearly and more directly, 
independent directors may well increase their vigilance in response. 
The SEC must also be more willing to initiate enforcement actions and 
seek sanctions, including monetary penalties and officer and director bars, 
against independent directors who flagrantly disregard their duties.183 As 
Commissioner Roel C. Campos emphasized in a written dissent to a settled 
proceeding against the four independent directors of Heartland Group 
Funds,184 the failure to impose severe sanctions against outside directors in 
the face of egregious misconduct undercuts the SEC’s recent initiatives to 
strengthen the responsibilities of independent directors and “diminishes the 
solemn obligation and duty of directors being vigilant in protecting the 
interests of shareholders.”185 Independent directors who recklessly fail to 
fulfill their oversight responsibilities may be liable under the broad 
fiduciary provision in Section 36(a) of the ‘40 Act, and depending on the 
particular facts and circumstances, may be liable for aiding and abetting 
fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act and Section 
17(a)(1) of the Securities Act.186 Independent directors who act negligently 
but not recklessly may be liable for violating Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See Thomas R. Hurst, The Unfinished Business of Mutual Fund Reform, 26 PACE L. REV. 
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the Securities Act, provisions which do not require the SEC to make a 
showing of scienter. 
2. Returning OCIE Staff to the Policymaking Divisions  
Another possible reform for the SEC to consider would involve 
dismantling the OCIE and returning staff examiners to their respective 
operating divisions.187 As others have noted, increased interaction among 
the OCIE’s approximately 500 examiners for investment companies/ 
advisers and the 200 or so members of the staff of the Division of 
Investment Management may allow problems and abuses to be identified 
more quickly, which may result in more effective and efficient mutual fund 
rulemaking.188 
Although the views of the current SEC staff, in particular directors and 
associate directors, should be sought and carefully considered, it is instruct-
tive to note that several former Directors of the Division of Investment 
Management have argued forcefully for a change. Specifically, these 
directors emphasize that frequent contacts and exchanges between 
examiners and division staff provides “interactive benefits” that result in 
higher quality rules and policies.189 
3. Continued Cooperation with the ICI 
As noted above, often-cited advantages of self-regulation include 
industry expertise and the greater sense of stake in the process that comes 
when industry members participate in the development of rules.190 To these 
ends, the SEC should heighten its interactions with the Investment 
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Company Institute (ICI), the principal trade association for mutual funds 
and their investment advisers. In particular, the SEC should encourage the 
ICI to take a more active role in proposing rules to the SEC for possible 
adoption. The ICI should also be encouraged to increase the number and 
frequency of the “best practice guidelines” it has developed for members.191 
Indeed, whenever new policies and procedures would benefit funds by 
boosting or restoring public confidence in the industry, the ICI should have 
very strong incentives to work with the SEC in the development of rules 
and guidelines for funds and their advisers.192 Thus, at least in the area of 
rulemaking and guidance for investment companies and advisers, system-
atic restructuring of mutual fund regulation is not at all necessary in order to 
capture several historical advantages of self-regulation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
With virtually every other household in the United States invested in 
mutual funds, effective and efficient regulation of the mutual fund industry 
must be a top national priority. But the creation of a new private 
regulator—whether along the lines of SROs such as the NASD and NYSE 
or the recently created PCAOB—would be a step in the wrong direction. 
For the reasons set forth in this article, much more can be gained by 
strengthening the SEC’s longstanding role as the principal overseer of 
mutual funds and improving other aspects of the existing regulatory regime. 
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